Tuesday, December 29, 2009

Everyone else is doing a predictions blog post…

I’m going to focus on the growth of semi-automated social engineering. Why? Well, first because we humans need to communicate and technology has recently exploded to facilitate this. Second, the important thing to focus in security is how things fail. Right now, things are failing (as usual) with the user. We can’t expect the user to be rational and security-minded, that’s what our job. So they are the weakest link and will continue to be exploited. Third, I approach infosec with a warfare mindset, not an engineering one. And defense engineering always follows advances in warfare. We will always be playing catch up.

Prediction One - Technology-mediated scamming of users soars past our capability to deal with it
By this I mean, I mean phishing, spearing, fake security alerts, social engineering malware. It will quickly reach the point where it will overwhelm not only our defenses but the even the context we use to describe it. There are so many attack surfaces and so little useful defenses in the hands of the average user, we’re in for a rough ride. Why will this get more prevalent? Well, because of...

Prediction Two - Better use of unclassified and "harmless" data to leverage higher access
Military wonks have been warning us about this for decades. Now we're going to see it go farther into the mainstream, especially with all the info stored in Facebook, LinkedIn, Flickr, blogs, and Twitter streams. Some of the worst stuff is being generated by our friends and family without our consent. Just ask Sir John Sawers. This will lead to...

Prediction Three - Attackers will becoming adept at exploiting unknown critical dependencies
There's dozens of these kinds of undocumented and unexpected linkages between our organizational security systems and the consumer-grade applications we all swim on a daily basis. Password resets that bounce out via email to our iPhone or Gmail accounts. Twitter links with embedded passwords that happen to match our main password. Web mail sites can be used to spread custom malware internally. They're considered low value and therefore have weak security accordingly. And what about those consumer grade systems? Well, expect...

Prediction Four - Larger attacks against "soft" targets because of items 1,2,3
Why hack Twitter, Facebook, Gmail, etc? Because that's where the money is, duh. Most of these services were designed to protect low-value assets and casual attackers. But that value is out of proportion because of the aforementioned dependencies, the value of this secondary data in escalating attacks, and the scam-value of the friend-trust relationships embedded in these systems. Which all leads to...

Prediction Five - The move of the traditional perimeter from the Untrusted Internet User to the Trusted User.
Most of the standard threat models say the normal user is somewhat trustworthy. Many say otherwise that's a bad idea. As items 1-4 become widespread, the popularly accepted models will need to evolve to simply not trusting the average user or customer in the slightest bit. For many high-risk applications, like web-banking or large e-commerce sites, we're pretty much there. Now everything will move to this level, even the common low-value / low-hanging fruit applications and services. Those of us folks who already live in that mindset, we'll be helping the rest of the world deal with the new paradigm. The standard of reasonable care will change to this new baseline and more resources will need to be expended. When will it reach that point? Probably soon. So what can we do about it?

In the near future, I see us faced with two choices: Radically alter the user experience to the point where any high-level application change (like transferring or altering valuables, changing your password or installing local software) looks like something out of a COBIT change control process (approval & authorization, separation of duties, mandatory change windows). Think "sudo" not only in our operating system, but also within our applications. We stuck a toe in the water with Vista and the users hated it. Another solution to pursue is to push more security downwards into the operational core (behavior monitoring, red flagging, white listing and application flow restrictions). Perhaps by combining these two, we can come up with something useful. I hope someone’s already working on a more intelligent warning tool that fires off meaningful alerts like “It appears that you are about to submit your credit card number to a server in Latveria whose domain was registered only two weeks ago. I think is a Phish and you should verify things before continuing.”

Those are my rough thoughts this chilly December day. I'll be thinking and working on solutions to these problems in the coming year. Let me know if you have any ideas that might help.

Tuesday, December 22, 2009

Ten ways to build/improve your infosec career

I talk to a lot of students and folks just launching their security career. This article is for you. Veterans, feel free to chime in and tell me what I missed or did wrong. On with the list.

1. Communicate in a business positive manner.

Learn to communicate on their terms, not yours. The worst problems that occur in infosec (and in technology) are communication problems. This is because techies don't speak to their customers (the users) in the language that their customers understand. It's also important to phrase things positively and not negatively. Instead of saying - "You can't use
56 bit crypto because the traffic is sniffable and now PCI compliant" in a project meeting, say "We should use newer encryption systems as customer's will expect us to do a quality job securing their data and it will reduce our legal exposure, yet it won't cost us anything to do."

2. Discover your assets
You accomplish goals if you don't know what they are. And you can't protect your assets if you don't where or what they are. After number 1, this is the second most common mistake I see infosec people make. To get an accurate read on this, you need to the grunt work. That means scanning with tools, interviewing people, reviewing documentation and examining configurations - then cross-referencing your results.

3. Do the risk analysis
Take your asset list, map the risks to them and rate them. This is your priority list. Everything you should do should circle back to this. If you've never done a risk analysis before, there are lots of different ways to skin that cat. Here's one. Here's another. And get creative. The bad guys will get creative so remember that when you're doing your analysis.

4. Never assume
If you don't see it for yourself, you shouldn't assume it was done correctly and completely. This is what audits should be about. Assumptions have a way of coming back at you in the worst way - like the confidential data you didn't know existed that is stored on the systems you didn't know were connected to the Internet. It's safe to assume one thing - you'll never know everything.

5. Don't compromise yourself
This is more than just ethics (which is important) but also about segregation of duties and who's orders you obey. The security team should never report to the IT director. IT's mission is to use technology to fulfill the business objectives. Security's mission is to use technology to fulfill the business objectives safely. Sometimes these things overlap, sometimes not. When push comes to shove, IT will let security slide to make a deadline. There are times when security can be sublimated to the greater mission, which brings us to...

6. Remember who signs your paycheck
This is a corollary flowing from items 5 and 1. Just because the organization wants to do something risky, doesn't mean you need to be a roadblock. Your job is to provide information to the decision makers about risk. If the organization is willing to take on the risk, then your job is to make sure it can be done as safely as possible. Remember, business is about risk. And you can never be 100% secure.

7. You can outsource tactical tasks, but never your strategic thinking
I've seen a lot of organizations outsource their firewalls, their log reviews and major project implementations. Sure, if you're got a very tight set of expectations locked into the contract that you can verify on an on-going basis (see #4). I've even seen organizations hire in consultants to do things like write their entire security policy or DR plan. You can bring in consultants to help with these things, but make sure you're feeding the strategy to build upon. You need to make sure that these outsiders are creating solutions that are as flexible and intimately fitting as a pair of good jeans. I've seen organizations throw down tens of thousands of dollars for cookie cutter security documentation which might get them through an audit but doesn't provide more value than that.

8. Stock your tool chest appropriately
Hat tip to shrdlu for pointing out the Alton Brown method of choosing tools. Whenever you can, choose a multitasker over a unitasking tool. You've got a limited budget and you never know what the business guys are going to throw at you (see item 6). The best deals are for things that you can use in a variety of ways to protect yourself in lots of different ways. For me, DLP is useful as a discovery tool (see 2), an access control and even as a general awareness tool (see 3). If can't afford a dedicated virtual server sitting around waiting to guest host the latest greatest VMware security tools then at least have some burned ISOs ready to go.

9. You can break the rules when you've mastered them
Until then, implement the best practices and the PCI compliance standards. They're there for a reason. And most people are getting hacked because they're forgetting to do the simple well-known stuff. This also applies to enforcing your own rules. If you truly understand the security policy, then you'll known when you can bend it (see item 6) and when you must enforce it (item 5).

10. Network
In person, online, at conferences, locally and around the world. Meet other security people and swap war stories. You'll want the advice and you need to commiseration. I try to attend at least one national conference a year and 4 local ones. Plus my blog, the Security Twits and my Brazen Careerist network. Find a mentor and be a mentor. It's important to give and to take. Even if you don't think you have something to contribute, you do (even if it's only to share your fails). And for many of us, the problem is the opposite. Stop bragging and just shut-up-and-listen. Nobody likes a know-it-all.

Christmas Bonus Item

11. The question of specialization
If you're already not along in your career, then you will discover that the consummate security professional knows everything about security. To be worth anything, you should at least be competent with the basics like the ISC2's common body of knowledge . But at some point, you'll be tempted (either by yourself or your organization) to start specializing. If you do end up specializing, my advice is to pick a couple of specialties. Not only does it make you more layoff-proof, but it's also a lot more intellectually interesting. Some of us end up specializing in being generalists (hah), which really means we end up specializing in management because we spend more time overseeing things than actually doing things. That's fine, just get very good at all these items. Heck, if you're a Heidi fan, you'll notice that our beloved geek girl detective specializes in forensics, penetration testing (social engineering, physical security, info reconnaissance) and malware analysis.