Friday, March 17, 2017

Blogging over at F5 Labs

In case you missed it, I've been doing a lot of blogging over at F5 Labs.

The Humanization of the Security Leader: What CISOs Need to Be Successful
When someone from the IT group gets promoted into security management, a common first lesson is that “geek culture” is ineffective in the boardroom. Just watch one episode of The Big Bang Theory and you’ll recognize the classic nerd character...

How Three Low-Risk Vulnerabilities Become One High
Revisting van Beek's Microsoft Exchange Autodiscover vulnerability to make it much deadlier. (Co-author)

Using F5 Labs Application Threat Intelligence
As security professionals, we often feel like we’re fighting a losing battle when it comes to cyber security. (Co-author)

The Risk Pivot: Succeeding with Business Leadership by Quantifying Ops Risk
Getting the security investments you need often comes down to making your case to management in terms of operational risk.

The Conflicting Obligations of a Security Leader

Faced with competing pressures, CISOs are ultimately the experts at assessing what’s truly at stake in their organizations.

Building Secure Solutions Successfully Using Systems Theory
When security solutions don’t work as planned, embrace the complexity and use Systems Theory tools to adjust, regulate, and redefine.

DNS Is Still the Achilles’ Heel of the Internet
Since the Internet can’t survive without DNS, let’s make our best effort to defend it.

Will Deception as a Defense Become Mainstream?
Defensive deception works well, but needs championing before we’ll see it as a best practice or compliance requirement.

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Sunday, December 4, 2016

7 Mistakes of InfoSec defense

I've been reflecting lately on the role of an InfoSec defender.  Having written a whole book on the subject forces one to think deeply about the day-to-day job of defense.  I've also been interviewing a lot of new people looking to step in my current defender role.  I'm seeing a lot of enthusiasm and smart thinking out there. Good stuff.

Unfortunately, I've also seen a few stumbles that I'd like to soapbox on. These are things that seemed like a good idea at first blush (see below) but in reality, not so much.

This isn't an exhaustive list and may not even be the most prevalent problems in the industry, but in my experience, this is what I see cropping up most commonly.

1. Prioritizing controls based only on auditor's demands instead of risk. 
When you do this, you waste resources on possibly unnecessary or unimportant risks. Auditors don't know everything and compliance frameworks don't always fit everyone.  Beware the fallacy that a missing control is the equivalent of a risk.  I've seen it more than once: "We're buying a NAC system because it was a finding in the audit." Is that a significant risk? "Well, not really... I'm not sure. Maybe?"  Prioritize based on risk. 

2. Prioritizing controls based only on the Headline of the Week.  
Egad, IOT DDOS botnets of doom! We need new defenses.  Stop, is that an actual risk for your organization?  What is the impact of a DDOS? Do the math and figure it out. Sometimes the answer will surprise you.  

3. Confusing Impact with Risk.
Impact is one factor of the risk equation.  An insider attack where someone steals all your source code will have a huge impact.  But is it a big risk? What are the odds of it happening?  How about an earthquake?  Don't fill up a risk report with just impact statements.   Risk is a combination of Impact and Probability of occurrence.

4.  Confusing Frequency with Risk.
Similarly, to the previous item, just because something is very likely to happen doesn't mean it will have a big impact on your organization.  Many also forget about all the good controls they already in place.  I've seen IT folks freak out about the high volume of SSH password brute force attempts... against a server set up to use SSH keys.  Or high volumes of TCP Port 1521 probes from the Internet when the database servers are buried deep between 3 layers of firewall and NATed. Very unlikely that these common attacks are actually going to get very far.

5. Overprotecting the wrong thing.
The classic: I have more budget so I'm going to get a new firewall. However, your old firewall is managing things pretty well and you have other serious risks to tackle next.  Maybe you need to fix cross-site scripting on your web application or lock down physical access to the server room.  Not as fun and sexy as a new firewall but you should make sure all your major risks are controlled before enhancing protection for a particular risk. 

6. Deploying shelfware. 
You've got a big problem and a vendor offers a big solution. POs are cut and solutions are deployed.  Except they're too complicated to manage. Or too cumbersome for users to deal with.  Require too much overhead to keep running.  Or require more admins than you have staff for.  This can also happen when IT and Security don't work together on a solution. Don't waste a bunch of money deploying a giant control that doesn't actually fit in your organization. This has been discussed by others before.  

7. Attacking an intractable head on with a supposedly simple solution.
I've seen folks go after the Big Whales of InfoSec risk with nothing but a fishhook and a row boat. Everyone in the organization has "local admin"? Just take away all their rights, we'll roll out a policy and force it through.  Yeah, except your organization isn't homogenous in use case or deployed versions of operating systems.  This quickly turns into a morass of exceptions and workarounds... and before long the whole thing is abandoned.  
Want more examples?  How about fixing SQL injection on the web app? Tell the developers to just patch it.  Easy to fix, just get them programmers motivated to fix it.  Phishing emails? Time for more user training. It's never that easy. If it was, don't you think everyone else would be doing it? As Mencken said, for every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong.  It's not always a straight line to victory so think before you implement.

Sorry for the listicle title. I couldn't resist. :-)

Monday, November 28, 2016

Tuesday, October 25, 2016

The future

I just got back from speaking at a conference in Palm Springs.  On the plane ride, I read the most excellent book Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction by Philip E. Tetlock and Dan Gardner.  Great book if you're doing risk analysis or threat analysis work.

One thing that really got under my skin was a reprint of a letter from Donald Rumsfeld to the President - "Thoughts for the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review".  It's a PDF download, so here is the heart of the letter:

If you had been a security policy-maker in the world’s greatest power in 1900, you would have been a Brit, looking warily at your age-old enemy, France.

By 1910, you would be allied with France and your enemy would be Germany.

By 1920, World War I would have been fought and won, and you’d be engaged in a naval arms race with your erstwhile allies, the U.S. and Japan.

By 1930, naval arms limitation treaties were in effect, the Great Depression was underway, and the defense planning standard said “no war for ten years.”

Nine years later World War II had begun.

By 1950, Britain no longer was the worlds greatest power, the Atomic Age had dawned, and a “police action” was underway in Korea.

Ten years later the political focus was on the “missile gap,” the strategic paradigm was shifting from massive retaliation to flexible response, and few people had heard of Vietnam.

By 1970, the peak of our involvement in Vietnam had come and gone, we were beginning détente with the Soviets, and we were anointing the Shah as our protégé in the Gulf region.

By 1980, the Soviets were in Afghanistan, Iran was in the throes of revolution, there was talk of our “hollow forces” and a “window of vulnerability,” and the U.S. was the greatest creditor nation the world had ever seen.

By 1990, the Soviet Union was within a year of dissolution, American forces in the Desert were on the verge of showing they were anything but hollow, the U.S. had become the greatest debtor nation the world had ever known, and almost no one had heard of the internet.

Ten years later, Warsaw was the capital of a NATO nation, asymmetric threats transcended geography, and the parallel revolutions of information, biotechnology, robotics, nanotechnology, and high density energy sources foreshadowed changes almost beyond forecasting.

All of which is to say that I’m not sure what 2010 will look like, but I’m sure that it will be very little like we expect, so we should plan accordingly.

This really got me thinking about the where we will be in warfare, especially considering the recent DNS DDOS attacks and a possible cyber cold-war.  Really makes you think.